Echo: X-Real-IP extractor trusts the header value instead of the sending peer

Özet

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Echo is a Go web framework. From 5.0.0 until 5.4.1, Echo v5's ExtractIPFromRealIPHeader validates whether the client-supplied X-Real-IP value belongs to a trusted range instead of validating the direct network peer. A client reaching Echo directly, or through a proxy that preserves the header, can supply a loopback or private address and have Context.RealIP return that spoofed identity. Applications using the extractor for IP allowlists, rate limiting, audit logs, or forwarding headers can consequently trust an attacker-controlled address; the default direct extractor and Echo v4 are unaffected. This issue is fixed in 5.4.1.

Etkilenen sürümler1 yazılım

Kaynaklar5 kaynak

• CVE.org kaydı
• NVD kaydı
• github.com/…k/echo/security/advisories/GHSA-h53f-rm2w-w7rg Diğer
• github.com/…commit/1855061e572ae9dab727c811d8382f266bfbaae Diğer
• github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v5.4.1 Diğer

Kayıt geçmişi

1. 28 Eki 2026 22:03Yayımlandı

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