Echo: Rate Limiter Bypass via Spoofed X-Forwarded-For Header in Default Configuration

Özet

Türkçe özeti henüz hazır değil; şimdilik kaynağın kendi açıklamasını gösteriyoruz.

Echo is a Go web framework. From 4.0.0 until 5.1.0, Context.RealIP falls back to client-supplied X-Forwarded-For or X-Real-IP values when Echo.IPExtractor is unset, and the default RateLimiter uses that result as its client identifier. A remote attacker can rotate arbitrary forwarded-address values to obtain new rate-limit buckets and bypass IP-based throttling used for controls such as brute-force or request-volume protection. This issue is fixed in Echo v5.1.0.

Etkilenen sürümler1 yazılım

Kaynaklar5 kaynak

• CVE.org kaydı
• NVD kaydı
• github.com/…k/echo/security/advisories/GHSA-246p-cpwv-v3jq Diğer
• github.com/…ommit/22e4b71109ef072ef011a489066ec662ca9565b2 Diğer
• github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v5.1.0 Diğer

Kayıt geçmişi

1. 28 Eki 2026 22:42Yayımlandı

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